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CAN A PATIENT-CENTERED ETHOS BE OTHERREGARDING? OUGHT IT BE?
Theodore W. Ruger*

The American health care system is built on a significant
conceptual tension that grows more intense with each passing year;
it devolves primary authority over medical decisions to
individualized physician-patient transactions, while increasingly
embodying
notions
of
group
solidarity
and
systemic
interconnectedness in its overall design. The passage earlier this
year of the landmark Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
1
(“PPACA”) only sharpens this tension. Many of the PPACA’s most
important measures reflect the principle of group solidarity. For
instance, insurers will be restricted in their ability to thinly slice
risk pools by practicing age and gender rating and by enforcing
2
The individual mandate to
preexisting-condition exclusions.
purchase insurance will drive more healthy Americans into larger
private risk pools, and the prices they pay will in many cases be
higher than is appropriate for their own age- and health-adjusted
actuarial risk; this mandate will effectively result in a redistributive
3
tax on youth and good health. On the public-finance side, the
PPACA’s substantial expansions of Medicaid coverage will be funded
primarily by higher taxes on affluent federal taxpayers, reflecting
an unprecedented commitment to guarantee coverage for virtually
4
every American below or near the poverty line. For all of these
reasons and more, individualized patient and physician choices
about utilization will, when aggregated, reverberate through an
increasingly integrated system struggling with profound cost and
quality concerns.
Despite enforcing a more robust (and in my view long overdue)
principle of collective solidarity in the overall health insurance
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
2. See § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–61 (defining exclusive permissible rating
criteria for individual and small-group markets).
3. See §§ 1501(a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. at 243; 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 908.
4. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson, Obama and the
Transformation of U.S. Public Policy: The Struggle for Health Reform, in
SUPPLEMENT: HEALTH CARE REFORM UPDATE 1, 5 (Mark A. Hall ed., 2010)
(describing the PPACA as “a bill that draws resources from the privileged to
spread access to affordable health insurance to most of the U.S. citizenry”).
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5

system design, the PPACA does little, in the short term at least, to
address the individualistic variation in treatment decisions and
utilization rates that many scholars and policy makers have pegged
as a major problem in the American system. High-profile examples
of this feature of health care delivery abound. A set of studies has
found dramatic variations in the Medicare cost per patient in
different regions of the country, even after controlling for all
6
relevant health, population, and price-index variables. The studies
concluded that differences in regional medical practice and
7
Another study
utilization patterns cause these cost variations.
found that physicians’ willingness to prescribe expensive cox-2
inhibitors to Medicaid patients for chronic pain relief varied from a
low of eleven percent of applicable patients in one state up to
8
seventy percent in another. Many scholars cite such therapeutic
9
variations as the source of major cost and quality concerns.
There is nothing new about this preference for individualization
in American medicine, or about the correlative resistance to
therapeutic standardization among providers and patients. This
norm has deep epistemological roots in the American medical
profession, and has been preserved and entrenched by constitutional
and legal structures of American health law until recent decades.
Medical historians, such as John Harley Warner, have described the
prevalence of a “principle of specificity” among American physicians
as the profession coalesced and sought enhanced status in the mid10
nineteenth century. For American physicians seeking to distance
themselves from the ideas of the major European medical centers, as
well as from universalist therapeutic regimes like Thomsonianism
and homeopathy, the notion of individualistic variation in treatment
became a central intellectual precept of the profession. So, for
instance, a Boston physician writing in 1861 claimed that
“[i]diosyncracy, or the peculiarities of the individual, are as
anomalous and impossible to reduce to rule and measure, as the
5. See § 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 908.
6. See DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE
1998 (John E. Wennberg & Megan McAndrew Cooper eds., 1998); Elliott S.
Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending.
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 288 (2003); W. Pete Welch et al., Geographic Variation in Expenditures for
Physicians’ Services in the United States, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621 (1993).
7. See DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., supra note 6, at 2; Fisher et al., supra note
6, at 288; Welch et al., supra note 6, at 625–27.
8. See Michael A. Fisher et al., Medicaid Prior-Authorization Programs
and the Use of Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2187, 2187
(2004).
9. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 6, at 297–98.
10. See John Harley Warner, From Specificity to Universalism in Medical
Therapeutics: Transformation in the 19th-Century United States, in SICKNESS
AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 87, 87–91 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers eds., 1997).
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11

passage of the clouds.” Professor Albert Stille of the University of
Pennsylvania claimed in a major lecture in 1884 that “[t]here is also
an art of medicine [that] completely eludes, or . . . flatly contradicts
12
Likewise, according to a Boston physician writing
science.”
contemporaneously, “No two patients have the same constitutional
or mental proclivities,” and thus, in language that clearly resonates
with our own age’s debates about cost-effective research and
standardized practice protocols applied to medical care, “[n]o ‘rule of
thumb,’ no recourse to a formula-book, will avail for the proper
13
treatment even of the typical diseases.”
Like the recent Dartmouth Atlas studies reveal, in the past
century such variation produced real and meaningful differences in
treatment between otherwise similarly situated patients. In a study
of hospital records from two mid-nineteenth-century hospitals,
Professor Warner documented the dramatically different
therapeutic protocols employed contemporaneously by doctors at a
14
major Boston hospital and a major Cincinnati hospital. Physicians
at the latter site were much more likely to employ invasive
techniques, like purging (induced by calomel or tartar enemic) and
bloodletting (venesection), often with adverse results for the
15
patient.
That
this
conceptual
preference
for
therapeutic
individualization persisted for over a century and became
successively more entrenched in the medical arena is no accident.
Individual physician authority was a key intellectual foundation of
American medicine in the nineteenth century, and its staying power
through much of the twentieth century was fostered in no small part
by the regime of American health law that arose
contemporaneously. The judicial doctrines that composed American
health law from the middle of the nineteenth century until the last
decades of the twentieth built on this diffused structure of medical
authority that prevailed among American physicians. Whereas
liability rules and private institutional ordering might have
operated over time to blunt or counteract the tendency toward
diffused authority, the rules that courts framed from the middle of
the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth only
sharpened the individualistic and atomized nature of medical
11. David W. Cheever, The Value and the Fallacy of Statistics in the
Observation of Disease, 63 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 449, 483 (1861).
12. Alfred Stille, Professor of the Theory & Practice of Med., Univ. of Pa.,
Address to the Medical Classes of the University of Pennsylvania on
Withdrawing from His Chair (Apr. 10, 1884), in 44 MED. NEWS 433, 435 (1884).
13. See Editorial, Routine Practice, 108 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 42, 43
(1883).
14. See generally John Harley Warner, Power, Conflict, and Identity in
Mid-Nineteenth-Century American Medicine: Therapeutic Change at the
Commercial Hospital in Cincinnati, 73 J. AM. HIST. 934 (1987).
15. See id. at 941.
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authority. As I explain in a longer work still in progress, the legal
rules that operated in this way are numerous—ranging from the
basic American constitutional structure that devolved authority over
medicine, to the laws of myriad state governments, to the weak
pressures for standardization imposed by state licensure regimes
and liability rules that permitted multiple schools of thought and
16
In the early
variation based on locality and practice setting.
twentieth century, other doctrines such as the bar on “corporate”
practice of medicine worked to preserve therapeutic diversity by
stunting the development of institutional forms of control over
17
medical practice. Though many of these core doctrinal rules have
been modified or abandoned today, health law played a major role in
the care and feeding of medicine’s devolved authority structure well
past the middle of the twentieth century, and relatedly contributed
to its normative entrenchment today even as formal doctrinal levers
have receded.
In the past several decades, American medicine has become
dramatically more patient centered, but hardly less individualistic.
The substantial transformation of authority within the individual
therapeutic relationship, which has been produced in the past
several decades by the emphasis on patient autonomy and informed
18
decision making, has not altered the orientation of medical
authority. Though the relative decisional authority of doctor and
patient may have shifted, and the norms of communication and self19
determination have expanded in dramatic ways, the legal and
ethical changes fostered by the informed-consent ideal have done
little to reduce the diffused character of medical decision making in
the United States. Medical decisions are now binary rather than
unitary, but remain devolved to the most particularized level of the
delivery system. If medical authority was atomized before, it is now
molecular. Although couched in a complex set of systems for
delivery and payment, medical decision making remains centered on
individual doctors and patients.
Recent events illustrate the deeply entrenched nature of this
authority structure. One of the iconic images of the recent healthreform debates was the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human

16. The working title of this article, which I expect to be published in 2011,
is The Ghosts of Health Law Past.
17. See Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time To Eliminate the
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 249–53 (2004)
(describing the rise of corporate practice doctrine).
18. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J.
899, 900–05 (1994) (describing the rise of the informed-consent doctrine after
1957).
19. See Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A
Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152, 152–53 (1996) (describing the “striking”
change in physician attitudes toward patient awareness and involvement in
treatment decisions).
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Services, Kathleen Sebelius, appearing on television in November
2009 to quell a growing uproar over the new recommendations for
breast cancer screening that were promulgated by a little-known
body called the United States Preventive Services Task Force (“Task
20
The Task Force, comprised of a dozen independent
Force”).
medical experts under the auspices of the Federal Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, is authorized by federal statute to
“conduct[] scientific evidence reviews of a broad range of clinical
preventative health care services [and to] develop recommendations
21
for primary care clinicians and health systems.” In this instance,
the Task Force found that the risks and uncertainties associated
with regular mammograms for healthy women under age fifty
outweighed the therapeutic benefit of earlier screening, and so
recommended against such regular screenings for women in their
22
The recommendations were grounded in sound science—
forties.
large-N studies from multiple countries—and were unanimously
supported by the physicians and scientists who staffed the Task
23
Force.
Still, despite the fact that this recommended standard of care
was entirely nonbinding on providers and payers, the Task Force’s
action provoked an intense and immediate backlash from
24
physicians, patients, and members of the broader public. Although
a fraction of this opposition articulated a reasonable difference of
opinion regarding risk assessment, much of the uproar was more
fundamental, responding to a perceived intrusion by a centralized
federal agency into a decision that had traditionally been vested in
25
Members of the public,
an individual patient and her physician.
physicians, and politicians claimed that the Task Force was part of a
broader effort to restructure American medical authority and to
20. See Stephanie Condon, Sebelius: Mammogram Recommendations Won’t
Set Policy, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301
-503544_162-5698251-503544.html.
21. See U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/USpstfix.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2010).
22. U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening for Breast Cancer: U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 151 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 716, 716–17 (2009).
23. See Dan Eggen & Rob Stein, Mammograms and Politics: Task Force
Stirs Up a Tempest, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at A1.
24. See Valerie Richardson, Sebelius Shuns New Mammogram Report,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009
/nov/19/sebelius-shuns-panels-advice-on-mammograms/.
25. See, e.g., Alexander Cautious of New Mammography Guidelines
Released by Government Task Force, CONGRESSMAN RODNEY ALEXANDER (Dec. 3,
2009),
http://alexander.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=25&parentid=23
&sectiontree=23,25&itemid=568 (“With these new guidelines, it is even more
apparent to me that health care decisions need to be made by patients and their
doctors. We need to reinforce this important relationship, not weaken it with
government intrusion.”).
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26

bureaucratize treatment decisions.
The Task Force’s tentative
effort to standardize practice in this area had threatened the
longstanding authority structure in American medicine,
characterized by diffuse and individuated medical authority.
Secretary Sebelius and others in the Obama administration
were keenly aware of the deep roots and latent power of these
structures and of the general resistance to medical centralization
held by Americans, even if they may have been surprised at the
intensity of this particular reaction. Within a few days of the Task
Force’s recommendation, Sebelius went to the media to expressly
distance the administration from the panel and, more pointedly,
from its epistemic assumption that medicine could be, or ought to
27
be, standardized through collectivized expert agencies. Calling the
Task Force an “outside independent panel of doctors” who “do not
set federal policy,” Sebelius proclaimed that decisions on
appropriate breast cancer testing, like other medical decisions, were
appropriately devolved to the individual judgment of physician and
28
She told the nation’s women to “[k]eep doing what you
patient.
have been doing for years,” and to “[t]alk to your doctor . . . and
29
make the decision that is right for you.”
In repudiating the Task Force and urging women to make the
decision “right for” them, Sebelius clearly opted for a patientcentered conception of decisional authority, as opposed to the
tentative standardization proposed by the Task Force. Although
such a statement quelled the public outcry in the short term, the
normative clash between these two visions of medical expertise is
bound to recur in a system that is becoming increasingly
interconnected, particularly given the scholarly and bureaucratic
interest in giving greater prominence to expert cost-effectiveness
research and best-practices standardization. In a medical economy
30
growing at unprecedented rates, and with cost increases driven in
31
part by patient- and physician-driven therapeutic variation, the
question is whether we can afford such heavily patient-centered
medicine.
A key question in light of these potentially conflicting visions is
26. See, e.g., Whitney Pitcher, Bureaucratization of Breast Cancer
(Nov.
20,
2009,
7:49
PM),
Screening?,
THEPALINATION.COM
http://www.thepalination.com/2009/11/bureaucratization-of-breast-cancer.html.
27. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary
Sebelius Statement on New Breast Cancer Recommendations (Nov. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/11/20091118a.html.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Thomas J. Parisi, How Much Did You Pay for Your Heart: Is a
Centralized Entity Performing Health Technology Assessment with CostEffectiveness Analysis the Answer to the Rising Costs of Healthcare?, 46
JURIMETRICS 285, 287 (2009) (documenting the rising costs of health care).
31. See Molly Cooke, Cost Consciousness in Patient Care—What Is Medical
Education’s Responsibility?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1253–54 (2010).
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whether a “patient-centered” approach to medical care is inevitably
in conflict with an approach grounded in collective solidarity and
advancement of system-wide cost and quality goals. Put differently,
is a well-meaning focus on the patient necessarily and entirely
individualistic, or can a patient-centered ethos of medical care
incorporate concern for broader systemic goals? The challenge for
the U.S. health care system in the coming decade and beyond will be
to moderate the excesses of a decentralized authority structure,
while retaining sensitivity to individual patient need and individual
physician judgment. I speculate briefly about whether such a
dichotomous framing of authority is possible.
At one level, of course, there are inevitable trade-offs. Creating
a system in which therapeutic choices are more sensitive to systemic
externalities (whether resource-related or otherwise) inevitably
involves some reorganization of authority. Though not a zero-sum
game, as discussed below, efforts to meaningfully standardize
treatment protocols necessarily make incursions on the substantial
decisional choice that has traditionally characterized American
medicine in recent decades. These incursions go beyond mere
resource constraint (though they might occasionally manifest as
resource constraint) and also threaten the independent value that
physicians and patients place on choice itself. As such, even regimes
in other countries that have operationalized global budgets and costeffectiveness analysis still profess deference to individual physician
judgment and the best interests of individual patients. In Great
Britain’s National Health Service, for instance, the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Effectiveness (“NICE”) has been
empowered to recommend against the use of new technologies that
32
are too costly relative to their returns, but its recommendations
contain the cautionary language that they cannot “over-ride the
individual responsibility of healthcare professionals to make
decisions appropriate to the circumstances of the individual
33
patient.”
The increasing interconnectedness of the U.S. health insurance
system going forward will increase pressures to standardize
allocation of resources, thus implicating a clash of normative values,
given the entrenched individualized authority structures that exist.
It is unlikely that an approach grounded in centralized budgeting or
allocation will gain traction in the United States in the short- or
medium-term. The alternative to this extreme is to explore methods
to reshape existing therapeutic relationships—and the law and
financial arrangements that shape those relationships—to achieve
greater sensitivity to values beyond those of the immediate patient
32. See David J. Kerr & Mairi Scott, British Lessons on Health Care
Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e21(1), e21(2) (2009).
33. R. v. Nat’l Inst. for Health & Clinical Excellence, [2009] EWHC (Admin)
2722 (Eng.).
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seeking treatment. Whether such other-directed medical ethics and
law can be made consistent with a “patient-centered” view of
medicine is a crucial question that remains open.
Building on existing law, policy, and scholarly commentary, I
raise here three intermediate paradigms that may serve to point the
way forward. The first two conceptual reforms retain the specific
physician-patient interaction as the fulcrum of medical decision
making, but aim to modify the financial arrangements and legal
duties that contextualize that relationship and exert influence on
physician-patient decisions. The traditional method of paying
physicians for specific medical procedures (fee-for-service medicine),
and the traditional fiduciary-duty doctrine that emphasizes loyalty
to the patient above all other values, have both contributed to the
fragmentation and individuation that characterizes American
34
medicine. Although reforms on both fronts create uncertainty and
grounds for concern, reforming payment policies and fiduciary laws
are necessary steps toward a more balanced approach to medical
care in the United States.
It is hardly new to suggest the necessity of meaningful payment
reform as a step in updating the American system of medicine—
35
such reforms are the centerpiece of much recent scholarship as
36
A common feature of
well as a component of the recent PPACA.
most of the ideas for payment reform that currently proliferate is
the goal of shifting payment models away from the traditional
stochastic per-procedure basis, which incentivizes individual
physicians and patients to collude to obtain more expensive care by
shifting costs of procedures to private or governmental insurance
37
pools. Accordingly, the common impulse is to restructure payment
models to compensate providers for something more comprehensive
than an unbundled set of health care inputs (procedures and
therapies).
So, for instance, some reform models would pay
physicians and hospitals “per episode” of care, while others would
34. See François de Brantes et al., Building a Bridge from Fragmentation
to Accountability—The Prometheus Payment Model, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1033, 1033 (2009); Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Resource Allocation in Healthcare:
Implications of Models of Medicine as a Profession, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED., Mar.
21, 2007, at 57, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1925021/.
35. See Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging
Models of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197–98
(2008) (describing various payment-reform models).
36. See Sara Rosenbaum & Jonathan Gruber, Buying Health Care, the
Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 403
(2010) (“In the end, the [PPACA] is all about altering individual economic
conduct, and its importance lies in the way it changes the when and how of
health care purchasing.”).
37. See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health
Insurance, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563, 576–88 (Anthony J.
Cuyler & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing moral-hazard problems in
traditional health insurance payment relationships).
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bundle episodes together and pay providers on an annual capitated
38
basis for each patient in their care.
The question of whether such bundled payment arrangements
are, or can be made to be, compatible with a patient-centered model
39
of care is hotly debated. To the extent that newer payment models
disrupt the traditional autonomy that patients and physicians have
traditionally enjoyed—autonomy that allows them to employ any
procedure justified under the capacious “medical necessity”
standard—they may initially appear to be less patient friendly. But
it bears emphasis that neither the classical fee-for-service model nor
the fully capitated model is, at the extreme, intrinsically more
matched to patient interests. Both models contain the seeds of
misaligned interests between providers and patients—the former by
encouraging too much and too invasive medicine, the latter by
incentivizing too little care. That only capitation is regarded as
dangerous is a testament to the medicalization of American health
care—with its heavy focus on interventions and procedures—and to
the continued entrenchment of that model today.
Under any payment model, it is important to have a legal or
bureaucratic backstop so that physicians squeezed by financial
incentives will not shirk on patient care. The traditional duty of due
care offers one such backstop, as does the related duty of loyalty.
Physicians bear fiduciary duties of loyalty and care (the malpractice
40
standard) to their patients, and courts have made clear that
innovative payment arrangements do not alter or release physicians
41
Courts have characterized the
from these baseline obligations.
physician’s duty of loyalty as an “implied promise” that the patient
should “be able to trust that the physician will act in the best
interests of the patient thereby protecting the sanctity of the
42
To the extent that this standard
physician-patient relationship.”
encourages physicians to take account of patient preferences and to
be solicitous of patient interests, it is clearly aligned with a “patientcentered” view of medicine. But to the extent that it prioritizes
fidelity to patient interests at the expense of all other systemic
considerations, such a standard appears anachronistic in a regime of
38. See, e.g., Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways To Pay
for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418, 1419–20 (2009); Rosenthal, supra note
35, at 1199.
39. See, e.g., Yunjie Song et al., Regional Variations in Diagnostic Practices,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 45, 46 (2010).
40. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (recognizing the physician’s duty of care and duty of loyalty);
Michael A. McCann, Message Deleted? Resolving Physician-Patient E-Mail
Through Contract Law, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 109–10 (2002–2003) (same).
41. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236–37 (2000) (declining to
expand fiduciary liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
despite an innovative payment arrangement, because of the overlap with
traditional malpractice liability).
42. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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greater interconnectedness and solidarity.
Accordingly, another key challenge for retaining patientcenteredness in a world of payment and delivery reform may be
reframing the retention and modification of these baseline liability
rules on physician conduct to be both patient focused and sensitive
to broader values. For those steeped in medical law and ethics, it
may seem incongruous, even oxymoronic, to contemplate a “duty of
loyalty” that is other-directed at all; traditionally the duty has been
framed in terms of the specific patient or perhaps clearly identifiable
third parties. But looking beyond the four corners of health law to
other fiduciary contexts offers some analogies. Long-established
principles of trust law acknowledge that a trust might have multiple
beneficiaries, and these principles have thus imposed on fiduciaries
duties of balance and even-handedness in dealing with
43
Importantly for the possible extension to medical
beneficiaries.
care, this duty of fairness does not mean that all beneficiaries’
shares of trust assets must be precisely equal; instead, trust
principles permit trustees to allocate greater shares to one
44
beneficiary in response to his or her greater need. But at all times
the fiduciary duty runs collectively to all beneficiaries, rather than
individualistically.
This impulse is occasionally reflected in positive statements of
environmental law. For instance, the National Environmental
Policy Act contains as one of its precepts for governmental action the
duty to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
45
the environment for succeeding generations.” That Act imposes a
fiduciary duty on federal agencies with respect to environmental
protection, but frames the duty of loyalty in broader terms that
include an intertemporal duty to generations not yet existing.
Under no conceivable formulation of a health care provider’s duty is
a similarly broad fiduciary mandate thinkable, but a smaller
measure of other-directedness is perhaps not out of the question for
medical law and ethics in the future.
I am skeptical that such an endeavor will, or ought to, dislodge
medical ethics from its individualistic focus. If that is the case, we
might invert the question posed here: rather than make medical
ethics more other-regarding, can we enhance sensitivity to patient
concerns on the part of the public and private institutions that in
future decades will exert more standardizing and collectivizing

43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2007).
44. See id. cmt. b (“It would be overly simplistic, and therefore misleading,
to equate impartiality with some concept of ‘equality’ of treatment or concern—
that is, to assume that the interests of all beneficiaries have the same priority
and are entitled to the same weight in the trustee’s balancing of those
interests.”).
45. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1)
(2006).
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pressures on the individual therapeutic relationship? Here I think
various existing design features are worth pursuing, in terms of the
composition of such panels and agencies (to include patient
representatives and decision rules permitting transparent dissent);
in the design of the metrics used to evaluate “effective” care (to
include patient-centric variables beyond merely optimal health
status outcomes); and in the review of the decisions of such bodies
by democratic processes and by an independent judiciary. Consider,
for instance, the rather tone-deaf promulgation of the
mammography guidelines by the Task Force discussed above.
Would the agency actions or communications relating to those illfated guidelines have been different if the Task Force had included
patient representatives or ethicists in addition to physician experts?
The question is significant enough to merit spending significant
time thinking about ways to make the new standardizing
institutions of American health care more consistent with a patientcentered ethos, even as inevitable tensions will remain.

